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I. The General Framework of U.S. Trade Policies in the 19205
The Tariff Acts of 1922 and 1930 were officially entitled "Acts
to Provide Revenue, to Regulate Commerce with Foreign Countries, to
Encourage the Industries of the Uni ted States, to Protect American
Labor (only in the 1930 Act), and for Other Purposes." If we disregard
the first two purposes (the traditional and more modern motives for
collecting customs), the next two make clear that the legislation was
intended as a "beggar-my-neighbor" policy of the U.S., the outcome of
a narrow understanding of the U.S. national interest without regard
for the effect of higher tariffs on world economic activity and its
backlash on the American economy. In many fields of production,
whether agricultural or industrial, the U.S. was the number-one
producer in the world, and in some fields, mainly of industry, it held
a share of more than 50% of total world production in the 19205. 1
Nevertheless, it approached the tariff question as it did in most of
the second half of the 19th century and as might be proper for a
developing country today seeking to spur domestic economic growth and
employment by means of protection of "infant industries". While a
developing country is probably justified in assuming that the reper-
cllssions of its measures on world economic activity are minor, if not
insignificant, and therefore the dangers of retaliatory trade measures
by other countries only slight or practically non-existent, this is
not so for a country that holds the major share of world economic
activity and trade.
An example from banking further illustrates this point. A small
bank might be able successfully to restrict its credit in order to
improve its liquidity situation without harming the overall credit and
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economic situation of its country, if the other banks do not do the
same thing at the same time. The dominant bank of a country with a
large share in total credit creation cannot do that, for even if other
institutions do not intend to change their policies, they are likely
to be forced into it, because credit restrictions by the dominant bank
diminish the available funds in all banks (by more than a marginal
amount), and this will cause a backlash. A deflationary spiral is
likely to start spinning. Wolfgang Stuetzel, some 30 years ago, bril-
liantly discussed the weaknesses ofeconomic actions taken fran a
"partial" perspective as opposed to actions based on a "global" per-
ception of its effects. 2
u.s. trade policies in the 1920s were clearly shaped by such a
partial perspective, while the weight of the U.S. economy now called
for actions based on a global perspective. William B. Kelly summed it
up: "As is frequently the case in government policies, there was a
long interval between the need for a different policy and the recog-
nition of this need and change in policy.,,3
The arguments on which the claims for protective tariffs were
based, were essentially of two kinds: (1) those that emanated from the
general principle which was established officially as the basis for
decisions on the scale of a tariff, namely that the tariff should
cover the production cost differential between foreign and domestic
producers; and (2) those that reflected the expectations of private
producers who saw themselves as being "entitled" to protection: as
having a private "right to protection.,,4
With reference to the first point, the wage cost differential
between domestic and foreign producers was the main argument in favor
of higher tariffs. Tariffs equivalent to the production cost differ-
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ences were regarded as necessary to defend the high level of wages and
of the American living standard. The result of this cost formula
approach was that tariffs were introduced and raised even on products
whose imports into the D.S. were negligible, while D.S. exports of
these goods were considerable. Thus, protection was granted to pro-
ducers, many of whom did not need it and would even have more to lose
from it, as foreign customer nations could easily retaliate against
the D.S. measures. Examples of this include barley, lard, oats, rye
and wheat. 5
The widespread acceptance of this cost formula as a criterion for
setting tariff rates in the D.S. is the best illustration of the
misperception that existed regarding the functions of trade policy. In
the year of the Declaration of Independence, Adam Smith published his
Wealth of Nations, which pleaded for the abolition of trade barriers
precisely because nations were producing the same products at differ-
ent costs (including wages) in absolute terms. If national economies
had free access to other nations' markets, each nation could
specialize in the production of those goods which it could produce at
lower costs than other national economies. This specialization would
lead to price reductions as the advantages of "economies of scale"
could be reaped. 6
Early in
further with
the 19th century David Ricardo refined this theory even
his concept of "comparative cost advantages. lI ? This
theory states that the international division of labor through the
free exchange of goods would be advantageous to participating nations
even when one country produced at higher absolute costs of production
in all field than others. If nations specialized in the production of
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those goods they could deliver at a relatively lower cost, then the
general welfare of all countries would increase. This rationalization
became the theoretical foundation of Great Britain's liberal attitude
towards international trade from the mid-19th century on. The free
trade attitude prevailed in Britain until WW land even beyond, in
I
spite of the fact that the British production costs, especially wage
costs, were for most of the per iod the highest in the world. 8
The U.S. by the end of WW I had grown into the shoes which didn't
fit Great Britain anymore, in other words, had replaced Great Britain
as the dominant economy in the world. 9 But the U.S. followed a differ-
ent path than Great Britain had regarding trade policies. The Repub-
licans chose not to embrace the British Smith-Ricardo tradition and
rejected the relatively liberal tariff terms of the Underwood-Simmons
Act, an outgrowth of President Wilson's "New Freedom" program, and
opted instead for the return to a protectionist tariff system, which
had been the foster-child of the Republicans since they became politi-
cally influential from the Civil War on. 10 Despite the fact that the
U.S. pressured for "open door" treatment of its exports abroad, it
erected a "Chinese wall,,11 around its domestic market in the 1920s.
This was at a time when the new dual role of the U.S. as the world's
foremost creditor nation and largest producer not only of agricultural
commodities, but now also of manufactured products, required the
opposite. The famous economist and international trade theorist Gott-
fried Haberler characterized u.s. trade protectionism coupled with
U.S. insistence on collecting war debts in the 1920s as "sadistic".12
B.M. Anderson, an American economist and banker, poignantly remarked:
"The debts of the outside world to us are ropes about the
necks of our debtors, by means of which we pull them towards
uso Dur trade restrictions are pitchforks pressed against
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their bodies, by me ans of which we hold them off. This
situation can obviously involve a very painful strain for the
foreign debtor.,,13
The protectionist Republicans did not recognize that Europe's
capacity to pay its debts to the U.S., as weIl as the world market's
capacity to absorb increasing American exports of manufactured goods,
required that foreign countries should have access to the American
market in order to earn the dollars with which to pay for U.S. exports
and to service their debts.
Furthermore, the production cost formula approach to tariffs ran
counter to the very logic on which international trade is based.
Except in those items where prestige value, special design or some
other feature dominates consumer behavior irrespective of cost con-
siderations, international trade would stop if all the tariffs
conformed to the production cost formula. 14 Its introduction by the
Republicans as a principle, 15 therefore, amounted to an all-out attack
on international trade itself.
Critics of the high U.S. duties were often referred to the so-
called flexible provision of the Tariff Acts of 1922 and 1930 which
authorized the President to change tariffs within certain limits (50
percent up or down). A need to reform the 1913 Act in this respect had
been acknowledged weIl before the Republicans regained power in 1921
by members of the Democratic as weIl as the Republican Parties and by
wilson hirnself. The President, in a letter of July 25, 1916 to the
Illinois Manufacturers Association, had recommitted hirnself to the
idea of a "flexible" or bargaining tariff, a position he had already
endorsed in his 1912 election campaign. 16 What this meant was that the
executive would have the power to alter tariff rates either upwards or
downwards without the consent of Congress. This proposal was based on
6
the experience that Congress had very often set tariff rates in
of government revenue problems and interest group pressures for
tection. The traditional procedure had not been favorable to





utmost the resources of the country in a vast development of our
business enterprise.,,17 Changes in tariffs under the flexible rule
would be based on the findings and recommendations of the U.S. Tariff
Commission. This nonpartisan commission existed from 1916 as an advi-
sory body to the Government. A "flexible" tariff was considered to be
a scientific tariff instead of an interest-group or partisan tariff.
In the preparation of the 1922 Trade Act, Wilson's idea of a
"flexible tariff", remained "alive and kicking" throughout the Repub-
lican Party's roll-back on the relatively liberal 1913 Trade Act of
the Democrats. But the idea was crippled. Section 315 of the Act of
1922 empowered the U.S. Tariff Commission with the right to recommend
rate changes (a maximum of 50 percent up or down). They were subject
to final approval by the President, and not Congress. It also allowed
the Commission to propose, again with the President deciding, that the
American selling price should be substituted for the "foreign value"
or for the "export value", (whichever was higher) as the base in
determining the ad-valorem rate. This was to be done whenever the cost
differential between domestic and foreign producers could not other-
wise be equalized. This "flexible provision" was introduced in the
1922 Tariff Act mainly in view of the unstable currency conditions in
Europe, which affected the production cost differential a great deal.
Because of its link to the production cost formula it was quite delib-
erately not an instrument on which hopes for a reduction of the tariff
7
rates could be pinned. 18 In the 37 cases between September 1922 and
June 1929 in which the President did order a change of tariff rates he
raised duties in 32 and reduced them in only 5 cases,
. I . t t" "t 19concern~ng on y un~mpor an ~mport ~ emse
the latter
Though this broadening of the executive's power can be regarded
as a step in the right direction towards future trade liberali-
zation,20 the President's voice in the decision process was still too
narrowly limited to enable hirn to steer policy towards truly serving
the national interest. For not only were rate changes not allowed to
exceed 50% (up or down); ad-valorem rate changes were not allowed at
all when the American selling price was substituted for the foreign
valuationi changes in the form of duties between ad-valorem and speci-
fic rates were prohibited. Transfers between the dutiable and the free
list were also not allowed. The most important limitation on the
President and the Tariff Commission was that they were to act only
within an established range of production cost differentials.
This approach had already begun to receive criticism by 1923. A.
Berglund objected to it, arguing that, apart from the fact that cost
differentials were difficult to determine, the flexible provision
"virtually commits the Tariff Commission to a protective tariff
policy," since it was based on the assumption that:
" an industry whose costs in the Uni ted States are higher
than those of a similar industry abroad is entitled to a
tariff safeguard equivalent to the difference between its own
costs and those of its foreign competitor. Differences due to
better location or other natural advantages, in so far as
they increase the competitive strength of the foreign
producer'21must be neutralized by a sufficiently high tariff
barrier."
Berglund pointed out the fact that the Tariff Commission was not
empowered to take into consideration the effects of import duties on
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V.S. export trade, as had been proposed by Senator Jones of New
Mexico. He denounced the trade policy makers for their failure to take
into consideration the influence that trade barriers would have on the
future development of V.S. export trade and on the possibilities for
the collection of V.S. foreign credits, and he described their
approach as the "narrowest provincialism." He concluded that the Act
of 1922 "is indeed in line with the intense nationalism which has
become so pronounced in recent years" and was translated "into a
certain amount of commercial isolationism." EXhibiting an amazing
prognostic insight, he finally asked the question: "Is this isolation
in accord with either our own aspirations or the world's needs?,,22
That V.S. imports of dutiable goods did not cease after 1922 is
partly due to the difficulties in implementing the principle. In most
cases producers at horne and abroad were naturally reluctant to dis-
close information on their production cost to the V.S. authorities,
i.e. to the V.S. Tariff Commission that was charged with such investi-
gations. 23
In considering the second point, the so-called "moral right to
protection", V.S. producers argued that the government had encouraged
industries to expand production during the war years under an "implied
contract that they would be protected against foreign competition
after the war was over.,,24 The Constitution was even used to back up
this position that private business had a "right to protection" by the
V.S. government. Senator Pine in a statement made in the Senate
Finance Committee over a tariff on petroleum invoked the Constitu-
tion's equal rights protection: "The Government can not deny the equal
protection of the law to any of its citizens.,,25 The net result of
this private-right approach to tariff rates was that decisions were
9
based more on private needs than on consideration of the public inter-
est.
The shaping of trade policies is, however, a matter of public
interest, and in its purest form should be guided solely by the public
interest, not by private needs, when it comes to deciding which indus-
tries should be protected and which should not, even in cases when
permitting the free entry of imports means the displacement of domes-
tic production. Defined in this way, it must be discriminatory. U.S.
legislators simply lost sight of the proper framework within which
trade policies should have been constructed, a framework shaped by the
national interest rather than by particular interests. In the case of
the 1922 Act there was little discussion of the principles of inter-
national economic policy in general and the functions of tariff policy
in particular; in the case of the 1930 Act the views of policy makers,
such as Senator Cordell Hull, who possessed an adequate frame of
reference, did not prevail. 26
11. The Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act of 1922
Until the Second World War the Republican and the Democratic
Parties traditionally pursued sharply different policies in foreign
trade matters. The Democrats advocated a "competitive", i.e. low
tariff, a "tariff for revenue only," while the Republicans advocated
protectionism. 1 The Democrats were more concerned about the effect of
tariffs on the cost of living and therefore more inclined to favor
free trade. The Republicans, in contrast, were more concerned about
the effect of tariffs on the business conditions of big industry in
the U.S. and therefore favored protective shields to foreign compe-
tition. Since the Republicans were in control of Congress and the
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Wh~te House most of the time from 1861 to 1913, they had established a
tradition of trade proteetionism in the U.S.
Eaeh of the two parties' attitudes towards tariffs ean also be
understood in terms of finaneial polieies. The Republieans predomi-
nantly represented the interests of the higher-ineome elasses and the
Demoerats those of the lower-ineome elasses. Import tariffs are indi-
reet taxes whieh burden the lower-ineome reeipient relatively more
than the high-ineome earner, whereas direet taxation tends to do the
opposite. The U.S. Federal Government's budget had traditionally been
entirely finaneed by indireet taxes, mainly from eustoms revenue.
At the time, party lines also strongly refleeted seetional divi-
sions of the eountry. The Demoerats stood up mainly for the agrarian
interests of the Southern states and of the Western farmers, while the
Republieans represented Northern industrial interests. The agrarian
seetions of the eountry were buyers of industrial goods (either impor-
ted or domestieally produeed) and the main suppliers of U.S. exports.
They regarded the finaneing of the federal government mainly through
high tariffs on industrial imports as unfair, as they improved the
terms of trade between agrieulture and industry in favor of industry,
and agrieulture was disproportionately burdened with federal taxes. A
federal ineome tax was regarded as more equitable and more oriented
towards taxation aeeording to eapaeity to pay.
It is, therefore, no eoineidenee that the Demoerats instituted
for the first time in Ameriean history (exeept during the Civil War) a
federal ineome tax in eonneetion with the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Aet of
1894, whieh revised tariff proteetion downward, although by not as
mueh as the original Wilson bill of the House had provided for. The
1 1
federa 1 income tax, however, was judged unconstitutional in 1895 by a
conse rvative judiciary in the Supreme Court mainly on the grounds that
the constitution required all federal direct taxes to be apportioned
among the states according to their respective population. 2 But after
the Democrats had won a decisive victory in the House elections of
1910, they again pursued a combination of institutionalizing a federal
income tax, which was successful in 1913 after the 16th amendment to
the constitution had been adopted, and a reduction of tariffs, which
was unsuccessful as long as President Taft kept vetoing such trade
bills. 3 But after the election of Woodrow Wilson in 1912, along with a
majority of Democrats in the Senate, the Underwood-Simmons bill was
enacted in 1913, which considerably reduced tariff protection to its
lowest level since 1861. (Table 1)4
This "new freedom" in foreign trade program of the Wilson era
never had a real chance to make its effects felt, as in the summer of
1914 WW I broke out, thus disrupting normal trade relations. During
the war years, European competition with American goods was virtually
eliminated, as Europe diverted its productive energies towards manu-
facturing for war purposes. Europe, instead of a "hunger" for new
markets to sell its goods, "hungered" for the goods themselves.
During the second half of WW I, the U.S. business community began
to recognize that there was a need for tariff revisions after the War
to avoid increased competition from the European countries. 5 The war
changed the U.S. status of a debtor nation to that of the world's
1 t di 6 Af h darges cre tor. ter t e war, it was eemed likely that the debtor
nations in Europe would want to dump their exports onto U.S. markets
inan attempt to pay back their debts and to regain some of the gold
lost as a result of the purchase of war materials from the U.S. While
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the U.S. government had during the war encouraged domestic production
of those products which had been imported before the war-related
disruption of world trade, e.g. dyestuffs, it had done so with the
understanding that it would protect these "infant industries" from
foreign competition that was expected to resume after the war. The
need for revision was also based on the expectation that the pre-war
unconditional most-favored-nation structure of international trade
might be lost forever and would be more and more replaced by a system
of trade preferences. 7
Already at the start of the war, Britain had granted special
tariff concessions to her colonial empire. These were expected to
become a permanent feature after the war. There were also indications
that Great Britain and her allies in Europe for one as well as the
Central European Powers for another would form some sort of tariff
union in peacetime. Great Britain and her allies in 1916 had already
planned this out in the Paris Economic Conference. They targeted their
program of preferential treatment at the Central Powers. They invited
the U.S. to share the privileges. The U.S. rejected this, seeing it as
a threat to its international trade prospects which were based on an
"open door" policy.8 It seemed almost certain that in the future the
Europeans would openly discriminate against the U.S., at a time when
the U.S. producers particularly needed open world markets as the war-
generated export demand would dwindle with an armistice.
With this in mind, it seemed necessary that the U.S. should have
high tariffs in order to give the President the bargaining power
necessary to win concessions from, or enforce retaliation on, its
European competitors. The Underwood-Simmons Tariffs were regarded as a
1 3
weak negotiating position for the U.S. to start from, as rates were
relatively low. At the time the Executive possessed no power to raise
them in order to retaliate against threatening trade discrimination
from abroad.
Under the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909 this had all been
possible. This tariff was actually a double-column tariff which had
regular rates and penalty rates that were 25% higher than the regular
rates. The idea behind this was that the higher rates would apply to
imports from those countries that were "unduly" discriminating' against
the exports of the U.S., while the regular rates would apply to the
imports from non-discriminating countries. This was a very harsh
measure, as the penalty duties would be applied across the board to




the penalties according to the degree of the discrimi-
a result, in practice, the penalty duties were rarely
Nevertheless, these penalties had to be regarded as a
protectionist sword of Damocles that constantly threatened foreign
exports to the U.S. 9
In 1919 and 1920 U.S. fears of increased European competition
were borne out by facts. After the wartime exchange controls were
phased out, European currencies depreciated sharply on the foreign
exchange markets. Some, like the German mark, dropped more than
others, such as the British pound, but all currencies for a while
changed their value in the same direction. 10 These depreciations gave
the Europeans a competitive advantage over American producers. 11
This situation was aggravated by the fact that U.S. prices and
wages went up in an inflationary post-war boom in 1919. Also, in 1919,
it became evident that the economic clauses of the VersailIes Treaty
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would create a situation in which postwar international trade would be
on a discriminatory basis. The best example of this was that Germany
was denied most-favored-nation status for five years by the Allies,
yet at the same time it had to grant this status to the Allies. The
special tariff treatment of both Germany's and Turkey's former colo-
nies, as weIl as England's, France's and the other Allies' tendency to
monopolize the world's oil resources, all violated the "open door"
policy of non-discrimination, a principle which the U.S. government
and business community relied on. 12
The Republicans returned to power with an unprecedented majority
in 1921, right in the midst of the early post-WW-I depression. Also in
view of the depreciation of European currencies, enormous pressure was
exerted on Congress by both agricultural and industrial sectors to
reinstall high tariffs, in other words to return to the traditional
Republican policy of protectionism. Congress acted quickly. The House
Ways and Means Committee started hearings right away, in January 1921,
on the tariff question. The Congress quickly passed an Emergency
Tariff Bill that provided for high tariff increases for agricultural
products. President Wilson, still in office, vetoed this billon March
3, 1921. But after President Harding was inaugurated, Congress met in
a special session and passed a revised Emergency Bill and by May
27,1921, the Emergency Tariff Act became effective. 13
This Act placed heavy, in many cases prohibitive, duties on
agricultural products. Thus the act appeased the demands of agri-
cultural interests. Agriculture had been particularly hard hit by the
price declines characteristic of the depression, and producers feIt
that they faced the danger "that the American market would be inun-
15
dated with low-priced commodities already in surplus in the United
States, such as hard wheat, and wool. 1I14
On the same day that the Emergency Tariff Act became effective,
the Dye and Chemical Control Act also became law. This act placed an
embargo on the importation of coal-tar dye products with a provision
that allowed for imports only when a specific dye could not be found
in the u.s. 15 Germany had had before WW I virtually a monopoly in the
production of such dyes. During the war the U.S. dye industry had
developed rapidly, with capital investment increasing from apre-war
figure of $3 million to $174 million. This was due to the absence of
German supplies during the war. When Germany reentered the world
market in 1919, the new U.S. industry naturally feIt threatened. 16
Parallel to the work on these two acts, the efforts at a general
reform of the 1913 Tariff Act continued. After the hearings by the
House Ways and Means Committee, which had started in January 1921, the
trade bill (H.R. 7465) was finally drafted and the committee chairman
Fordney reported it to the House on June 29, where it was passed on
JUly 21 with a vote of 289 to 127. The bill was referred to the
Senate, where it was discussed in the Senate Finance Committee chaired
by Senator McCumber for a long time. Hearings were again held and it
took until August 19,1922, before the Senate passed a substantially
modified draft of the bill (2000 changes)17, with 35 Republicans and 3
Democrats voting for it, and 24 Democrats and 1 Republican voting
against it. 18 In general, the revisions by the Senate were in favor of
more protectionism. The Senate gave in to the wishes of agriculture
and industry to such a degree that even Fordney declared the revised
tariffs to be too high. On the other hand, the Senate dropped the
protectionist idea of import valuation according to the American
16
selling price instead of the foreign export price (with the exception
of chemical imports) and also the prohibition of imports of dyestuffs.
Both measures had been part of the original House bill. 19
The Conference Committee of both Houses - consisting of 6 Repub-
licans and 4 Democrats - quickly compromised on the differences
between the Senate and the House bill and the final bill was passed in
the House with a vote of 210 to 91, and in the Senate with 43 to 28.
17 Republicans in the House and 5 in the Senate, specifically from the
states of Wisconsin and New York, opposed the bill. President Harding
signed and enacted the billon September 21, 1922. 20 This came after
20 long months of log-rolling, discussion, and debate. The act went
against the principles of the 1913 Act, and in terms of tariff in-
creases it was the most protectionist step ever taken in U.S. history
thus far. The Smoot-Hawley Act of eight years later would raise the
tariff walls even higher, but the relative increase in tariffs was
much less in the 1930 Act than in the Fordney-McCumber Act.
The 1921 trade bill met with little opposition that argued for
free trade. The slogan was rather:"moderate non-excessive tariffs. 1I21
The Democrats argued against excessive tariffs on food and textile
imports by pointing out that the burden would fall on the consumer,
and they argued generally that high protection served only the inter-
ests of big industry, specifically the trusts. Most of the experts
sided with the opposition. But in the hearings the interest groups
succeeded again and again in impressing the legislators by pointing
towards growing U.S. imports, the increasing unemployment and the
danger that the depressed currencies abroad would further flood the
American market with cheap imports. Low tariffs -- they argued
1 7
would be of particular benefit to the former enemy countries and would
mean unemployment for those who had fought the battles for the V.S. or
22
who had supported the war effort by buying the Liberty Bonds.
Some interest groups sided with the Democrats in opposing the
high protective nature of the tariff bill, namely those that had much
to lose from a cutback in foreign trade, mainly the shipping industry,
importers and industries with a large export share like the automobile
and film industries, also part of the labor movement, consumer organi-
zations, and of course the New York banks. These groups voiced their
opposition mainly through the National Foreign Trade Council, the
National Council of American Importers and Traders, and the Fair
Tariff League. But with minor exceptions they did not succeed in
making inroads into the protectionist front of the Republicans, who
treated the tariff question as a party affair to such an extent that
they paid no attention to the views of Democratic members of Con-
23gress.
Opposition to the original 1921 House draft of the bill was also
voiced within government circles but extended to other matters than
the tariff rates. The State Department under Charles Evans Hughes led
the drive towards using tariff reform as a tool to ensure the "open-
door" principle of equality of treatment. Congress, which was used to
dealing with tariffs in a concessions-negotiation (reciprocity) type
format, i.e. special tariff arrangements with some countries on a
reciprocity basis, provided for such reciprocity arrangements in the
1921 House bill and thereby violated the equality-of-treatment prin-
. I 24Clp e. Section 301 called for special concessions. Section 302
authorized the president "to impose penalty duties on specific pro-
ducts of any country which imposes duties or similar exactions
1 8
upon like or similar products" of the U.S. 25 The State Department saw
less danger in high foreign tariffs than in discriminatory treatment
of U.S. exports by foreign countries. The State Department believed
its equality-of-treatment principle to be endangered by such pro-
visions. William S. Culbertson, the vice-chairman of the D.S. Tariff
Commission and a key figure behind the new legislation, backed the
State Department position. The Senate was receptive to this, and the
subsequent Senate version of the bill dropped the concessions-
negotiation (reciprocity) provision of Section 301. It ensured a one-
column tariff (while the 1909 Trade Act had in fact imposed a double-
column tariff) and as a weapon against foreign discrimination (not
against high tariffs abroad which Section 302 of the House Bill had
been directed at) adopted Section 317 as one of the flexible pro-
visions of the 1922 Act (retained without significant change as Sec-
tion 338 of the 1930 Trade Act). It authorized the President to levy
penalty duties of up to 50 percent ad-valorem on any or all products
of countries that discriminated against U.S. exports, whenever "the
public interest will be served thereby." The provison was never
applied. But its existence proves that the flexibility of the Trade
Acts of 1922 and 1930 provided for much more freedom of action for
tariff increases than for tariff reductions. Culbertson was pleased
with the results. He and the State Department believed that the open-
door principle had prevailed, though Culbertson did acknowledge that
the proposed tariff rates were too high -- a fact that in his view
could be remedied later. 26
The Republicans in shaping the Tariff Act of 1922 worked on the
basic assumption that they would res tore the level of tariff rates
1 9
that were in effect before the Democratic Party came to power in 1913.
The Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909 was an important point of refer-
ence, and it was not surprising that many of the rates imposed in 1922
were the same as those specified in the 1909 Act. The average ad-
valorem tariff rate on dutiable goodes was about 41% under the Payne-
Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, compared to 27% under the Underwood-
Simmons Tariff Act of 1913. Under the Fordney-McCumber Act from 1922
to 1929 the average ad valorem rate was restored to around 39%.27
This is not the complete story, for the 1913 Act had also liber-
alized trade by admitting an increased number of imports duty-free. On
the "free list" were such products as steel, raw wool, coal, shoes and
boots, and agricultural implements. The 1922 Act cut down this list,
removing such products as iron and steel from the free list, but it
did not restore the 1909 conditions. Thus, while the average ad
valorem rate of protection on dutiable and free goods had been almost
20% under the 1909 Act and 9% under the 1913 Act, it increased only to
14% under the 1922 Act. 28
There are two reasons why the average ad-valorem level of
protection in the 1920s did not reach the same level as those between
1910-12. First if all, most duties were specific rates, i.e. expressed
in a fixed amount of dollars per unit of imports versus a percentage
of the import value. The general price level was much higher in the
postwar period than it had been before the war. So, even though a
number of tariff rates were higher after 1922 than after 1909 in
absolute terms, the average ad-valorem protection was lower. Secondly,
the Fordney-McCumber Act in some cases, e.g. for coal-tar dyestuffs,
raised duties so high that they were prohibitive and succeeded in




tariff revenue to decrease relative to the amount of imports.
Under the 1922 Act there were few cases of low tariff rates or of
small increases in customs rates. They were usually granted to
domestic producers who had already gained a substantial share in
export markets and feared that foreign governments would retaliate
against the higher U.S. protection. The classic examples are the iron
and steel industries. Until 1913 these two U.S. industries tradition-
ally had been nurtured under a shelter of high tariffs, but as they
were now important exporters it seemed important to them to keep trade
relations as "open" as possible. Another case, one growing in impor-
tance, was the automobile industry.29
The 1922 Act basically restored the tariff rates in the following
product fields to their 1909 level: the bulk of textiles, a great part
of the earthenware and glassware articles, as weIl as some agri-
cultural products. But as these rates were expressed as specific
rates, the net result was a reduction in the ad-valorem
(from the 1909 level) due to the general rise in the
during the war and postwar years.
There were instances where the new rates were weIl above the
historical precedents. Such cases concerned mainly the various
chemical industries, especially coal-tar products, certain manu-
factured articles such as cutlery, clocks and toys, several minerals
and alloys used in metallurgical operations, and a wide range of
agricultural products. These drastic increases concerned import pro-
ducts that either threatened domestic producers, since the war-related
trade distortions had ended, or commodities for which the 1920/21
depression had brought about a sharp decline in prices, mainly agri-
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cultural products. As far as these products were concerned, the U.S.
was exporting considerably more than it was importing, in other words,
they were products in which the country was very competitive. High
agricultural tariffs were used or rather misused as price-support
instruments in a time of depression, in complete disregard of the fact
that tariffs were there to stay even after recovery from the depres-
sion. In other cases, the tariffs were designed to equalize production
cost differentials between countries. This goes against the very
principle upon which international trade and competition is based. It
is true that there was areal competitive threat to U.S. producers
from the rise in domestic wages and prices up to mid-1920 and from the
external depreciation of the floating European currencies, which most-
ly outpaced their internal depreciation. But the last-mentioned phe-
nomenon only reflected the fact that the European economies needed a
production cost advantage in order to increase their exports so that
they could earn the necessary foreign exchange needed to pay off their
foreign debts.
A striking example that illustrates just how concerned tariff
makers in Congress were over details of production cost differentials
between countries, was the great "Cuckoo Clock" incident. During the
debates on the tariff rates, to highlight a point, Senator McCumber
hirnself held up a cuckoo clock pointing out the fact that this clock
could be bought in Germany for 94 cents, but that in New York it had a
retail price of 22 dollars. The point: that importers were making
"unholy" profits and were "crowding out" domestic clock manufacturers
from the market. This served to propel an excessively high tariff on
clocks through Congress and to inspire one journal to publish a highly
critical article entitled "A Cuckoo in the Tariff".30
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One industry that did not succeed in getting all it wished in the
1922 Trade Act was the coal-tar dye industry. The embargo on coal-tar
dye imports of the Dye and Chemical Control Act of 1921 was not
retained, as the domestic producers had wished. But they were more
than compensated for that omission by the granting of a very high ad-
valorem tariff rate, and by this rate being based on the American
selling price, not the foreign export value which was the usual pro-
cedure. 31 What it all amounted to was a prohibitively high protection,
which had the same effect as an embargo would have had. 32
I have cited these examples in order to illustrate this point:
that the Fordney-McCumber Act effectively prevented the world's
number-one debtor country, Germany, from having easy access to the
markets of the largest creditor nation, the U. S., 'particularly in
those articles that Germany produced most efficiently. This came at a
time when international financial relations required the opposite. The
U.S. government was neither prepared to forgo the huge war debts the
Europeans owed to the U.S., de facta though not de jure linked to the
German reparation payments, nor was it prepared to open its markets to
European exports so that these countries could earn the dollars neces-
sary to pay off these debts.
The 1922 Tariffs were, of course, supported by the forces of
protectionism, which were particularly strong among small and medium-
sized firms. They expressed their views mainly through the American
Tariff League and its journal "The American Economist", as weIl as
through the Horne Market Club and its journal "The protectionist". 33
But the 1922 Tariffs also met with criticism from some economic
sectors. Within the business community, opposition to the new pro-
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tectionism arose from two camps: those who exported manufacturErl gocrls
on a large scale, in other words, the export secto r, and those who had
an interest in exporting capital, namely the international bankers.
The first group feared foreign retaliation to the American protec-
t ionism, the latter group recog nized that foreign debtors would have a
difficul t time in earning the dollars they needed t 0 serv ic e their
debts, if they met with high trade barriers.
In the case of the exporters, their view was primarily voiced in
newspaper articles, especially those appearing in papers like the "New
York Tribune" and the "Chicago Tribune", as weIl as puhlications
appearing in smaller cities on the East Coast and in the Midwest, and
also in trade papers like the "American Metal Market".34 These arti-
cles reflected the opinions of giant industries, like iron, steel,
metal and automobiles, which tended to have a more liberal attitude
towards international trade. On the political scene, such bodies as
the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) represented their view.
The international banking community's view was weIl expressed by
Thomas Lamont of Morgan & Co. He stated in 1922 that the new tariff
protected "a lot of industries which do not need protection, and cuts
off from our farmers and manufacturers a lot of foreign markets that
are ready to buy our commodities." It would "surely wreck a big part
of our foreign trade." Paul Warburg, the president of the American
Acceptance Council, voiced a similar opinion and further stated that
the high tariffs would prevent Europe from paying its war debt to the
u.s. 35
Leaders of the Democratic Party, such as Norman Davis and Cordeil
Hull, remained critical throughout the 1920s. They attacked the Repub-
lican Party's policy of promoting high tariffs and at the same time
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encouraging American bankers to seIl foreign government bonds. Davis
remarked in 1925 that although the outflow of American capital might
temporarily promote American exports, in the long run, the high tariff
policy would disable foreign countries to earn the revenue required to
repay their loans, and the entire debt structure would collapse. 36 The
Reparations Agent in Germany, Parker Gilbert, more familiar with the
world's greatest debtor nation than anybody else in the D.S., was
highly critical of the situation the D.S. had created. After it had
closed its country to foreign immigration in 1924 (Immigration Re-
striction Act),37 he expressed his view in a letter to a friend in
1925, when he was dealing with the State Department about the issue of
German municipal loans floated in the D.S. He complained that the more
basic problems, which the State Department refused to confront, were
created by the American high tariff policy and the immigration re-
strictions whereby "we are making it increasingly difficult for other
countries to pay us in goods and services ... And at the same time we
are pressing our debtors abroad to pay us.,,38 This view is also a
reflection of Parker Gilbert's close affiliation with the Morgan Co.,
of which he became a partner after his return from Germany.
Some of the D.S. politicians who had framed the Fordney-McCumber
Act hoped that the high tariffs could serve for more than merely
satisfying the narrow interests of the pressure groups that sought and
were granted the protection they wanted. They hoped to use this act,
with its principle of equality of treatment, as an instrument to
undermine the threatening system of trade discrimination that was
emerging abroad, specifically, the British imperial preferences and
the French two-column reciprocity tariffs.
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The D.S. government
throughout the 1920s tried to negotiate trade treaties on the basis of
the unconditional most-favored nation-clause. But this policy -- with
few exception, notably a treaty with Germany -- failed to eliminate
preferential trade agreements, especially those of Britain and France.
European governments argued that the high tariffs of the Fordney-
McCumber Act were just as much an impediment to world trade as their
discriminatory systems were. 39 In addition, the "flexible" provision
was regarded to be useless in promoting trade liberalization, as it
did not allow for tariff reductions other than those that equalized
cost differentials.
The Fordney-McCumber Act completely disregarded the historical
lesson that without tariff concessions as a quid-pro-quo tariff nego-
tiations aimed at opening up world markets were doomed to failure. For
example, a tariff was even introduced on wheat imports, a product
which the U.S. was a huge net exporter of. On the one hand, it is
understandable that domestic producers threatened by foreign compe-
tition would resist tariff concessions that favor export industries,
when foreign countries might lower their tariffs in return. Yet it is
beyond comprehension why the U.S farm lobby failed to see that the
prime victim of a tariff on wheat would be the domestic producer
himself as soon as foreign countries followed suite It shows a large
degree of narrow-mindedness to draw conclusions from an equation from
which the other side has been omitted. Therefore, it seems to me,
Arthur D. Gayer and Carl T. Schmidt were correct in judging that the
schedules of the Tariff Act of 1922 were "incapable of rational de-
fense.,,40
In order to judge the effects of the 1922 Act, it seems useful to
compare U.S. foreign trade performance after 1922 with that in the
26
prewar period. U.8. foreign trade had more or less grown steadily in
the last 13 years before WW I. From 1900 to 1913 U.8. exports grew
nominally at an average annual rate of 4.5 percent, total imports by
6.0 percent annually.41 In real terms the growth rates were not quite
as high, but still positive. U.8. real exports.showed an annual
average growth rate of about 3 percent, real imports a rate of about 5
percent. As far as the settlement of trade accounts with Europe was
concerned, there was the characteristic triangular flow of trade. The
U.8. ran an export surplus with Europe, raw materials and foodstuffs
being its major export items. Europe ran an export surplus with Latin
America and the Orient, selling primarily finished manufactures, and
Latin America and the Orient had an export surplus with the U.8.,
supplying primarily raw materials. 42
U.8. tariffs impeded the expansion of this triangular flow in two
ways after WW I. At this time Europe needed an overall export surplus
to service the war debts. But the Emergency Tariff Act of 1921 and the
Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922 restricted the growth of U.8. imports of
primary products, which came mainly from Latin America and the Orient.
The foreign exchange earnings of these parts of the world were thus
being restricted and thereby their purchasing capacity for European
finished manufactures was narrowed. The Fordney-McCumber tariffs on
finished products, on the other hand, restricted the growth of direct
European exports to the U.8. precisely for those goods which consti-
tuted the bulk of export products of the indebted Europe. During the
per iod in which the relatively low Underwood-8immons Tariffs had been
in effect, U.8. imports had grown dramatically, especially after the
end of WW I. Total U.8. imports in 1920 were almost 200% higher than
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in 1913 in nominal terms and about 32% higher in real terms. Due to
the depression they fell sharply in 1921 to slightly less than half of
the previous year's value and by 16% in real terms. In 1929 total U.S.
imports in real terms were about 50% higher than in 1920, U.S. imports
of finished manufactures in 1929 even 75% above their level of 1920 in
real terms. The problem, however, was that the share of finished
products in total U.S. imports remained relatively small. As a result
of the disruption of U.S.-European trade during the War, it had
dropped from 22.5% in 1913 to 16.6% in 1920. In 1929 it had recovered
to the 1913 level, but not more.
At the same time, U.S. exports that had grown dramatically from
1913 to 1920 (by 40% in real terms), but not much thereafter (by 14%
in real terms until 1929), underwent an important structural shift.
The share of finished manufactures in total U.S. exports had reached
only 32% in 1913; by 1920 it amounted to 40% and by 1929 to 49%. This
indicates that the U.S. was making deep inroads into the traditional
European export markets for finished products in third countries,
while keeping its horne market, which was growing rapidly during the
prosperous 1920s, relatively closed to its European competitors.
The structural shift in the composition of U.S. exports, however,
was of great importance also under a different perspective. As the
outside world and especially the European countries realized, it made
the U.S. vulnerable to tariff retaliation practically for the first
time in its history.43 Before WW I especially the European countries
had often protested against U.S. protectionist legislation, but they
could hardly retaliate. At the time when the McKinley Tariffs were
enacted (1890), almost 80%, and at the time when the Dingley Tariffs
went into effect (1897), almost 70% of total U.S. exports still
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consisted of raw materials and foodstuffs which Europe needed.
Retaliation was impossible against such export items. But in 1922
semi-finished and finished manufactures together amounted to already
51.5%, in 1930 even to 63.8% of total U.S. exports. Trade retaliation
had become a sharp weapon against the U.S.
sively.
and it was used exten-
As J.M. Jones Jr. in his classic study on Tariff Retaliation
pointed out:
"It is scarcely to be supposed that a foreign government
would proclaim openly the retaliatory character of a piece of
local legislation when there are at any given time in any
country so many convenient local considerations which might
serve as apretext. Tariff retaliation, if it is to have any
meaning at all, must cover the entire range of reciprocal
tariff action from immediate, logical raising of import
duties by a government upon the imports coming from a country
which has injured its economy by its initial tariff action --
this action being admittedly retaliatory -- to those cases in
which the psychological effect of one country's tariff
action, when placed in the scales in a second country on the
side of these interesta which continually work for higher
tariffs, causes that go~~rnment to decide in favor of
increased import duties."
In the course of the 1920s almost all governments of the world
did retaliate in the second sense. The list of tariff advances abroad
from 1922 to 1929 is so long that it cannot be presented here. It has
been weIl covered in studies of the U.S. T . ff C . . 45ar1 omm1SS10n. None-
theless, of the foremost industrial countries in the world, namely
England, Germany, France, and the U.S., the U.S. retained the lead in
tariff protection of its domestic market. 46 The only country known to
have had a slightly higher average rate of tariff protection in the
1920s than the U.S. was Spain.
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111. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930
In his early assessment of the Tariff Act of 1930, Abraham Berg-
lund was explicit about the origins of this climax of U.S. pro-
tectionism in stating that it was "partly an outcome of the post-war
agricultural depression.,,1 American agriculture, which had experienced
its most prosperous years during and immediately after WW I (Table
3), was badly hit bythe early postwar depression 1920/21. Farm prices
and incomes recovered somewhat until 1925, but their development in
the second half of the 1920s showed all the symptoms of depression,
while the rest of the economy was booming. The terms of trade between
agriculture and industry, which had improved markedly in favor of
agriculture from 1917 to 1i19, deteriorated thereafter and remained
far below their wartime level all through the 1920s. 2
The platform for the presidential election adopted at the Repub-
lican Party's Kansas City Convention in 1928 did not only not consider
the high tariffs since 1922 as a possible cause of the agricultural
depression, but instead traced the roots of U.S. prosperity in the
1920s to the high existing tariffs. The platform made it clear that
more protectionism was to be expected. It also repeated the Repub-
licans' main argument for protection, namely lower wages abroad.
"We reaffirm our belief in the protective tariff as a
fundamental and essential principle of the economic life of
this nation. While certain provisions of the present law
require revision in the light of changes in the world
competitive situation since its enactment, the record of the
United States since 1922 clearly shows that the fundamental
protective principle of the law has been fully justified •••
Nor have these manifest benefits been restricted to any
particular section of the country. They are enjoyed
throughout the land either directly or indirectly. Their
stimulus has been feIt in industries, farming section, trade
circles and communities in every quarter. However, we realize
that there are certain industries which cannot now
successfully compete with foreign producers because of lower
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foreign wages and a lower cost of living abroad, and we
pledge the next Republican Congress to an examination and
where necessary arevision of these schedules to the end that
American labor in these industries may again command the horne
market, may maintain its standard of living, and may count
upon steady employment in its accustomed field... A
protective tariff is as vital to American agriculture as it
is to American manufacturing. The Republican party believes
that the horne market, built up under the protective policy,
belongs to the American farmer, and it pledges its support of
legislation which will give this market to hirn to the full
extent of his ability to supply it. Agriculture derives large
benefits not only directly from the protective duties levied
on competitive farm products of foreign origin, but also,
indirectly, from the increase in the purchasing power of
American workmen employed in industries similarly
protected. 1I3
When accepting the presidential nomination, Hoover promised to
stand by the "protective principle" and to revise the existing
tariffs. He denounced the Democratic Party for working against the
interests of workers and farmers in their traditional opposition to
protectionism.
"We have pledged ourselves to make such revisions in the
tariff laws as may be necessary to provide real protection
against the shifting of economic tides in our various
industries. I am sure the American people would rather
entrust the perfection of the tariff to the consistent friend
of the tariff than to our opponents, who voted against our
present protection to the worker and the farmer, and whose
whole economic theory over generations has been the
destruction of the protective principle. 1I4
In the presidential campaign of 1928, Hoover kept promising more
protective tariffs as an aid to agriculture. 5 In this campaign, the
Democratic Party -- traditionally taking a liberal stance in foreign
trade matters -- and its presidential candidate Alfred E. Smith had
more or less abandoned their former attitude and also adopted policies
of trade protection. 6 That both parties endorsed protectionism at this
time might well be an indicator of the political power that narrow-
minded interest groups had won over electoral politics, which had
become more and more a matter of financial funds. Myers observed that
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by embracing protectionism "it is possible (for a party) to bring
within its fold the business and industrial interests that are so
necessary to supply not only the votes, but also the party funds and
special campaign contributions that are an absolute condition of party
success.,,7 As we know, Hoover and the Republicans won the edge in the
election by a wide margin, and now had to implement higher tariff
protection "as a partial remedy for the existing agricultural
depression".8 There had been initiatives in Congress before to intro-
duce price-support policies for agricultural products, most noticably
the famous McNary-Haugen bill, which was passed twice by Congress in
1927 and 1928 and vetoed by President Coolidge both times. 9 To this
kind of market intervention most Republicans in Congress and their
Presidents in the White House had always been opposed. Higher tariffs,
however, seemed to offer a solution to the problem of low farm prices
which was in line with the Republican tradition of favoring protec-
tionism.
In his inaugural address to Congress on March 4,
Hoover underlined what he had pledged in his campaign:
1929, President
"Action upon some of the proposals upon which the Republican
Party was returned to power, particularly further
agricultural relief and limited changes in the tariff, cannot
in justice to our farmers, our labor and our manufacturers be
postponed. I shall therefore request a special session of
Congress for the consideration of these two questions. I
shall dÖal with each of them upon the assembly of the Con-
gress. ,,1 .
Immediately after the election, the Congress, in which the Repub-
licans had majorities in both Houses, had started to work on the new
trade legislation. When Congress convened in December 1928, it had
been agreed that the special session, which Hoover had promised to
agriculture already during his campaign, would have a first discussion
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of a revised tariff act in the spring of 1929. It was assumed that the
matter had to be handled speedily not only with a view to the economic
situation of agriculture, but also in order to finish the labor on the
tariff bill before the new Congress would come into session in Decem-
ber 1929. 11 When the House Ways and Means Committee issued its public
notice on the hearings concerning the tariff issue in December 1928,
it was already clear that the revision would not be limited to the
agricultural tariffs. This Committee held its hearings for 43 days in
January and February 1929 and supplementary briefs were taken in as
late as April 18. Thereafter, the Committee drafted the bill and
finally its chairman Hawley introduced it into the House on May 7,
1929. The House immediately referred it back to the Committee which in
turn reported it back to the House, where it was passed 264 to 147 on
May 24, with only 12 Republicans voting against the bill as against 20
Democrats from industrial areas voting for it. 12 It was clear by then
that the tariff changes would not be "limited", as Hoover had origin-
ally intended the revision to be. "In addition to widespread increases
in farm duties, however futile and insignificant, there were increases
on almost every other commodity that might possibly suffer from
foreign competition.,,13
The haste with which the legislative procedure was handled is
further evidenced by the fact that the Senate Finance Committee issued
public notice of its hearings on the billon June 7, 1929, and held
those hearings from June 13 to June 18. An extensively revised form of
the bill was reported to the Senate by the Committee chairman Smoot on
September 4, weIl in time to meet the deadline for enactment of
December 1929. But the bill met with opposition in the Senate and was
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stuck for a while. A coalition of Democrats and some insurgent Repub-
lican senators from the West tried to pass aresolution sponsored by
Senator Borah of Ihaho to limit tariff revisions strictly to agri-
cultural products. They almost succeeded. The conflict lingered on
past the deadline for the legislation as originally planned (December
1929), until on March 24, 1930 the Senate passed the bill 53 to 31.
Some tariff rates had been reduced as compared to the original House
Bill. But more important than this, Senator Smoot, assisted by Senator
Joseph R. Grundy, the president of the Pennsylvania Manufacturers
Association and one of the organizers of the American Tariff League,
had managed to trade eastern support of agricultural duties for west-
ern support of industrial duties and thereby broken the stalemate. The
opposition had, however, forced the adoption of a provision for export
debentures (a bounty paid out of customs revenue to American farmers)
and had succeeded in passing the control of the flexible provision of
the tariff from the President to Congress. The conference committee,
with strong support from President Hoover, forced the Senate to drop
these two important amendments. The final vote of the Senate on June
13, 1930, showed the discontent. The bill was passed by a majority of
only two votes (44 to 42, 10 abstentions). Eleven Republicans, headed
by Senators Borah and Norris, voted against it as against the five
Democrats who voted for it. The next day the House approved the final
bill 222 to 153. 14 It is noteworthy that Berglund observed that the
principal influences deciding which way a Congressman or a Senator
would vote were the industrial or sectional interests represented. 15
President Hoover signed and thereby enacted the billon June 17, 1930.
The nature and the origins of the Act, this climax of O.S.
protectionism, is best revealed when one studies the log-rolling
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party.,,20
Schattschneider shows that the interest groups' influence on the
shaping of the bill depended on how weIl they were organized and with
whom in Congress they had their close informational ties. Those who
had to lose most from protectionism, namely the importers and con-
sumers, were not represented in those economic groups that were in
possession of large sums of capital, therefore they lacked the
lobbying organizations which big business usually disburses in politi-
cal decision centers to defend its interests. They lacked both the
financial me ans and information channels which would have allowed them
to respond quickly in defense of their anti-protectionist interests.
It was in consequence of this that they were hardly ever represented
in the Committees' hearings.
Producers, both agricultural and industrial, and their organi-
zations, almost exclusively ran the show in the Congress Committees
and filed their demands for protection, which were based only on
assessments from their narrow sectional viewpoints. Schattschneider
points out that the Committee members were largely responsible for the
dominance of sectional views in their inquiry. They seemed to have no
"clear and adequate conception of the natures of the public values of
industries which might justify the expenditure of a bounty upon them
• ... The hearings, therefore, were expedited at the cost of an enor-
mous neglect of the proper functions of inquiry.,,21
He observed that "to an amazing degree the hearings were permit-
ted to take whatever direction was given to them by the witnesses
themselves.,,22 The data submitted in the briefs were not checked, the
statements were not audited, the witnesses were not required to pres-
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involved in its making. The hearings, of which Schattschneider has
given us such a lucid and detailed account, turned out to be a tremen-
dous Sysiphean labor for the Committees. 1,100 persons applied for a
hearing before the House Ways and Means Committee and a hardly smaller
number before the Senate Finance Committee. Not all were heard, but
the severe work pressure is evident from the 11,000 pages of testimony
and briefs which the Ways and Means Committee collected in 43 days and
5 nights and from the 9,000 pages the Senate Finance Committee accumu-
lated in slightly more than a month. 16
Schattschneider noted correctly that "the sentimental basis of
the protective system is nationalism." 17 This sentiment had already
been the basis on which the Tariff Act of 1922 had found such wide
acceptance, a sentiment which President Reagan in a famous remark once
called the "bunker mentality" of protectionism. 18 But while the Act of
1922 had been preceded by a change of the party ruling in the White
House with the Republicans, traditionally protectionist, taking
over -- the trade bill of 1929 was again the outcome of a presidential
election, but this time without a change of parties at the head of the
Executive. Schattschneider summarizes the character of the bill of
1929 as folIows:
"The bill was a Republican measure written by partisans
It was arevision of a protectionist law by protectionists
for people whom they sought to make more and more
protectionists. 1I19
He substantiates this point by describing the role which the
American Tariff League played in the shaping of U.S. trade policies.
He notes that this organization had "the greatest repository of skill
and experience in pressure politics of the tariff" and that it "may be
appropriately described as an ancillary organization of the Republican
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ent the sources of their statistics. "In an investigation of this
sort, it is probable that the most valuable information is that which
must be extracted more or less forcibly from witnesses who are reluct-
ant to give it.,,23 Thus, the hearing turned out not to be "an inquiry
by a governmental body into the merits of public policy.1I24 With the
exception of quest ions posed by Senator Cordell Hull, Member of the
House Ways and Means Committee, it was like a negotiating table at
which every major premise of the petitioners were conceded in ad-
vance. 25
Although it was the depression in agriculture that was the prime
motive behind the new customs legislation, the revision of the tariff
rates was not limited to agricultural products. For industry demanded
its share in the protectionist revision and asked for higher rates on
finished goods, if only to compensate for the advances of duties for
their raw material imports. 26 Though the increases of the tariffs on
manufactured goods were less than on raw materials, many manufacturers
took advantage of the occasion to lessen the pressure of foreign
competition on the domestic market. For example, the textile industry
especially pressured for, and received, higher protection.
Not only do individual tariff rates determine the degree of
protection of the domestic market, but also the tariff structure is
important. Therefore, there are usually not only conflicts between
protectionist and free-traders, but also among those favoring protec-
tionism. For the tariff structure determines the effective rate of
protection of the different stages of production. Even low average
tariff rates, i.e. a zero rate on raw material imports and a 25%-rate
on manufactured goods, can be as beneficial and protective to manu-
facturers as a flat 50% rate on all imported goods. The overall
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average tariff protection influences primarily the distribution of
income between trading nations, whereas the tariff structure by
affecting the relative prices of goods in the domestic market
influences primarily the distribution of income among domestic pro-
ducers. 27
u.S. agricultural producers had based their claim for more pro-
tection on the relative decline of agricultural prices relative to the
prices of industrial goods in the 1920s. One would have expected them
to stand up against industry's claim for higher industrial tariffs as
much as they pressured for more protection of their own products. But
this conflict -- as mentioned before -- ended in the fatal compromise:
protection for all. Schattschneider explains it in the following way:
"The situation has about it something of the air of a great
conspiracy .. There has developed, as a result, a certain
comity of interests expressed in a policy of reciprocal non-
interference: a mutuality under which it is proper for each
to seek duties for himself, but improper and unfair to oppose
duties sought by others ... The great farm organizations,
which might have been expected to furnish the leadership in
an assault on the industrial schedules, in fact subscribed
strongly to the strategy of reciprocal non-interference in
their dr~Me to establish a parity of agriculture and
industry."
Berglund as early as 1930 observed that "the tariff act of 1930
will mark the apex or cUlminating point of protection in this coun-
t ,,29ry . In general, one can say that the 1930 act was a continuation
of the high tariffs for many products given in the act of 1922. In
1930, only a few tariffs were reduced, while many more were increased.
This is reflected in the rise of the average ad-valorem protection in
Tables 1 and 2.
The reductions were a result either of the transferring of pro-
ducts from the dutiable to the free list or of the lowering of rates
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set by the Fordney-McCumber Act that were regarded as out of pro-
portion. For instance, some excessively high tariff rates set in 1922
on certain chemicals, aluminium, and a few other products were
lowered. 30
One particularly outstanding example of a tariff reduction in
1930 is that of automobiles. The O.S. auto industry was so advanced in
production techniques and in the scale of production that it had no
fe ar of foreign competition on the domestic scene. In fact, it needed
foreign outlets to seIl its mass-produced autos. The industry feared
the reprisals against American auto exports abroad that might result
from an unnecessarily high O.S. tariff on car imports. Auto manu-
facturers had repeatedly asked for a transfer of automobile imports
from the dutiable to the free list, with Congress finally agreeing to
reduce auto tariffs from 25% (according to the Act of 1922) to 10% ad-
valorern.
Tariffs remaining unchanged after 1930 include iron and steel.
Until the Underwood-Simmons Act of 1913, the iron and steel industries
had been a bastion of high protectionism. By 1913, due to its modern
production techniques and large production scale, these industries
feared the exclusion from foreign markets more than they feared
foreign competition in the domestic market. The Fordney-McCumber Act
of 1922 had raised the tariffs somewhat on iron and steel as against
the liberal 1913 schedule, but the rates remained, for the most part,
far below those that were in effect during the heydays of iron and
steel protection in the half century before the First World War. In
the Act of 1930, they were kept unchanged at the low or moderate level
that they had been at before.
Also unchanged by the Act of 1930 was the treatment of those
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items that remained on the free list, which even after 1930 was quite
extensive. In 1931 and 1932, about two-thirds of all imports into
America were admitted free (about the same share as was allowed in in
previous years).31 This is no proof of a continuing liberal stance
towards international trade, rather it is in line with the protec-
tionist concept that the list consisted mainly of products which were
not or could not profitably be produced in the U.S., such as raw silk,
rubber, coffee, tin as weIl as many commodities that were not weIl
suited for production in the U.S.
Though the share of imports allowed in duty-free did not change,
their value did decrease enormously: from $2.9 billion in 1929 to $2.1
billion in 1930 to $1.4 billion in 1931 to $0.9 billion in 1932. 32
This reflected partly the price decline in these commodities during
the depression years, but it also reflected the decline in the total
volume of imports. That the percentage of free goods in total free and
dutiable imports remained constant, despite the fact that some impor-
tant commodities which had been previously admitted free under the
1922 Tariff Act (some sorts of lumber, long staple cotton, bricks,
shoes and boots, sole leather, hides, hydraulic cements) were made
dutiable by the 1930 Act, was due to the fact that the imports
dutiable under the 1930 Act declined even more than those on the free
list. This was because in many cases tariffs were set prohibitively
high. Hence, any attempt at calculating the average rate of customs on
all imports or on the dutiable imports, on the basis of the current
volume of imports, like those done by the Bureau of Foreign and
Domestic Commerce (see Table 1) are misleading in judging the effects
of tariff changes. Obviously they do not take into account the rates
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which are totally prohibitive. As Berglund observed, "if all the rates
for dutiable commodities were so high as to be absolutely prohibitive,
it could be argued that the average level of rates under the new law
had been reduced to zero.,,33
This same reasoning must be applied when interpreting the data
that President Hoover used to make the tariff increases of the 1930
Act look moderate. Hoover stated that the average level of tariff
rates on all imports (free and dutiable) were raised only to an
average of 16% ad valorem in 1930 as against the 13.8% under the Act
of 1922 and the 25.8% under the highly protective Dingley Act of
1897. 34 The truth of the matter is that tariffs increases over the
1922 levels were substantial, especially in the case of agricultural




i.e. for products from mines and quarries, were
as previously mentioned -- were transferred from
the free list to the dutiable list. It is important to note that the
tariffs on primary commodities were usually specific duties, a fixed
dollar levy per unit of imports. The effect of such a tariff is that
when the price declines the ad-valorem protection increases. As prices
of most primary products had declined since 1925, the ad-valorem
protection of the U.S. market for these products had therefore
increased,.even before any new trade legislation was introduced in the
second half of the 1920s, and would have risen even faster amidst the
collapse of prices during the Great Depression beginning in 1929. In
calculating the ad-valorem increases in tariff rates under the old and
new trade legislation, it is difficult to separate the effects of the
price decline, on the one hand, from those caused by the tariff
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increases of the Act of 1930, on the other.
In a large proportion of cases, the increases in the specific
tariffs per unit amounted in 1930 to 50% or more, for some items to as
much as 100%. Sometimes the increases were "hidden", that is the duty
primary
theseforPrice changes
in contrast to those on
mostly ad-valorem tariffs.
therefore, did not affect the rate of protection. Though
wereproducts,
products,
industry is the only real example of an industry that received
than that in protection.
Tariffs on manufactured goods,
remained unchanged under the Acts of 1922 and 1930, and the increase
in protection was effected by other means. A good example is the case
of manganese ore which was needed in steel production. The specific
duty remained at one cent per pound of contained manganese. But under
the Act of 1922, only the manganese in excess of 30% ore content was
dutiable, whereas the Act of 1930 made the manganese in excess of a
10% ore content dutiable. As most of the manganese ore imported had a
metallic content of about 50%, this amounted practically to a doubling
of the tariff rate. 35
On the whole, tariff increases on manufactured products were less
than those on primary products. Tariff increases for manufactured
goods were primarily of a compensatory nature, that is to make up for
the increases in rates on primary products, so that the effective rate
of protection for manufacturing industries would not fall. The textile
more
agriculture's ad-valorem protection automatically had increased as a
result of the agricultural price declines after 1925, this had not
been the case for most of manufacturing. This demonstrates the bias of
protection towards agriculture. In this respect, the results of the
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trade law of 1930 conformed to Hoover's initial intentions.
While the 1930 Trade Act was still in the making, over a thousand
professors in 179 colleges and universities in the U.S. signed an
appeal to Congress and President Hoover urging them to prevent the
passage of any legislation that provided for an upward revision of
tariff protection. President Hoover specifically was asked to veto the
bill, if Congress passed it. It was argued that higher duties would
raise prices and the cost of living, thereby encouraging production at
excessively high costs, which meant inefficiency and waste. They
claimed the tariff increases would also seriously affect U.S. invest-
ments abroad and would limit the exports of both farm and manufactured
products, and would most likely encourage tariff wars. 36
The academicians, in contrast to the majority of the policy-
makers, were aware of the global or macrocosmic consequences of such
legislation. In fact they exhibited a better understanding of the
principles by which U.S. foreign trade policies should be conducted
than Congress or the White House. Newspaper comments over the appeal
and the Tariff Act itself showed that the economists were not the only
ones in the country who were shocked by the "orgy" of protectionism in
Washington. The American Bankers' Association, importers, and indus-
tries dependent on foreign markets also protested, not to mention the
thirty-three foreign governments that were up in (trade war) arms. 37
Legislators tended to dismiss the criticism either by reacting harshly
or by simply denying the impartiality or scientific spirit, as in the
case of the economists. Senator Shortridge of California remarked that
he was not "overawed or at all disturbed by the proclamation of the
college professors who never earned a dollar by the sweat of their
brow by honest labor -- theorists, dreamers. 1I38 As we know, the crit-
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ics did not achieve their goal, but developments since then have shown
the validitiy of their points.
The foreign nations' reaction to the 1930 D.S. Trade Act was much
more bitter and quick than it was to the 1922 Act. J.M.Jones Jr. in
his classic study of Tariff Retaliation noted that " never has the
Dnited States in peace time experienced such an extended and violent
foreign reaction to any piece of local legislation as that attending
_the Tariff Act of 1930.,,39 In 1930 the rate of increase of D.S.
tariffs over their 1922 level was much less than in 1922 over the 1913
rates. Taussig, therefore, was probably right, when he played down the
proposed tariff increases in an article in Foreign Affairs in October
1929 by pointing out that the tariff rates of the Fordney-McCumber Act
were already in most cases far beyond the moderate level (30 percent
ad-valorem) and were therefore troublesome to the foreign exporter
anyway. And increase from, for example, 55 to 65 percent ad-valorem
would not make much difference. But he cautioned:
" it is the direction in which we move that chiefly
counts. At the present juncture in international affairs,
more depends on the spirit which we show than on the precise
things which we do ... Shall we continue to suspect, to fear,
and to cultivate fear (of imports)? To treat the foreigner
from whom we get goods as always an enemy and an intruder? To
circumvent hirn, to bully hirn, rouse his resentment and his
irritation? Or shall we treat hirn as we wish to be treated
ourselves? Here too it is the spirit that signifies.,,40
So it seems that the 1930 rate increases, especially for agri-
cultural products, whose prices had declined and whose ad-valorem
protection had therefore automatically increased already since 1925,
cannot alone explain the extensive round of retaliation to the D.S.
measures. The different shape and direction of the world economy in
1922 and in 1930 must have played an important role in motivating the
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bitter foreign reactions. In 1922 the world economy was qrowing, on
the upswing after the depression of 1920/21, and U.S. credits were
readily available. In 1930, the situation was the reverse. J.M. Jones
Jr. regards the depression as "one of the chief causes for such wide-
spread retaliation and discrimination against the United States
following the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act.,,41 In his view the 1930 Trade
Act had also contributed to the deteriorating performance of the world
economy: " ... the world depression and the Hawley-Smoot Tariff are
inextricably bound up one with the other, the latter being not only
the first manifestation of but a principal cause of the deepening and
aggravating of the former.,,42
Some supply-side economists concerned with rational expectations
formation in the setting of the Great Depression have since the 1970s
also taken this view by pointing out that the stock market crash in
October 1929, which marked the beginning of the world depression, was
triggered by the investors' realization of the harmful effects that
the proposed trade legislation would have on international trade and
t · 1 . 43na 10na prosper1ty.
How the Smoot-Hawley tariffs aggravated the Great Depression was
well described by a contemporary expert observer, the British econo-
mist Arthur Salter. During the First World War, he argues, the U.S.
turned from a debtor to the world's greatest creditor nation, but it
kept on exporting more than it imported, the difference being made up
for by U.S. capital exports. Thus the foreign debts were not serviced
out of commodity export earnings. But, as Salter says, "it was impor-
tant that America should, to the utmost possible extent, receive what
was due to her in the form of actual goods; and that her commercial
policy should be designed to facilitate this. In other words, the
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In fact, it wasAmerican tariff needed to be the lowest in the world.
one of the highest."
Two cornerstones, on which U.S. trade policies in the post-WW-I
period were based, were: 1.) the equality-of-treatment principle, i.e.
non-discrimination, and 2.) the unconditional most-favored-nation
clause, on which trade treaties were concluded. But at the same time
tariff making in the U.S. was considered to be a purely national
issue, in the making of which -- as Jones points out "foreign
nations should have no influence and even American foreign interests
no weight.,,45
When the U.S. Congress -- on the basis of such nationalistic
viewpoint -- proceeded with the enactment of the Smoot-Hawley tariff,
unimpressed by the formal and official protests of 33 foreign nations
to the U.S. Government, it actually turned the equality-of-treatment
principle into an " equa lity-of-negation" principle, as had been con-
tended in an article on the trade issue in January 1929, when the
legislative action began. Prohibitive tariffs, the author argued,
rendered equality of treatment valueless. Countries that had a tradi-
tion in specializing on the production of certain articles of high and
unrivaled quality -- because of their natural resources or particular
national skills -- faced the "Chinese Wall" around the American market
and, although it had the same height for everyone, it made everyone
fee I like being discriminated against. 46 In fact, the U.S. discrimi-
nated against the rest of the world by almost closing its markets to
the products of all foreign countries. So Switzerland feIt discrimi-
nated against by the increased duty on watches, France by the proposed
tariff on a particular kind of lace, Spain by the duty on cork, Italy
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by the tariff on olive oil, Canada by the increased protection against
foodstuffs and raw material imports, etc. 47
The closing of the important American market to highly special-
ized export products of other countries was perceived by foreign
producers as direct discrimination against their products. Among the
populations of foreign nations this created a psychological situation
favorable to retaliation. A diverse series of reactions ensued:
" ... cancellation of most-favored-nation treaties with the
United States, actual measures of retaliation, new con-
ceptions of international responsibility, new practices in
commercial relations based upon strict reciprocity which
guarantees reciprocal treatment, and growin~ disrepute of the
unconditional most-favored nation clause.,,4
The Italian reaction demonstrates best how strong an impact the
smoot-Hawley tariffs were expected to have on production abroad. The
1930 Act aroused public resentment to such a degree that there was a
widespread boycott of American automobiles, before the Italian
government raised the tariffs on American auto and radio imports to
practically prohibitive levels. Italy went on to further retaliate by
successfully diverting large purchases of raw materials from the U.S.
to other countries that were willing to reciprocate. In Switzerland a
public campaign to boycott U.S. products was launched successfully.
The Swiss government then proceeded to increase tariffs, to introduce
import quotas, tariff controls and a compensation system to secure
reciprocity in its crudest form as a close substitute for barter trade
and bilateral treaties. Spain withdrew the most-favored-nation treat-
ment from the U.S. and concluded most-favored-nation treaties with
France and Italy. France reacted with successive tariff increases,
commercial treaty denunciations, an import quota system, and the
abandonment of the most-favored-nation treaty system in favor of
47
preferential treaties. Canada in 1930 radically increased tariff
rates, enlarged preferential treatment of imports from Britain, and
under the name of "countervailing duties" established reciprocal
tariff increases on agricultural products, which went into effect
"automatically" at the same time as the Smoot-Hawley tariffs. Great
Britain turned fully away from its traditional free-trade attitude and
in 1932 adopted a general system of high tariffs coupled with a broad
extension of imperial preferences (the Ottawa Agreements).49 The
German government until the final end of reparations in the
Lausanne agreement in July 1932 -- thought itself to be more in need
of political support by the U.S. in the reparation question than in
need of an open U.S. market. It did not retaliate directly. But, in
fact, it turned to a policy of autarky and bilateral trade arrange-
ments, after it had established foreign exchange controls in the
summer of 1931 and an elaborate system of trade controls in 1932/33. 50
What this world-wide refuge to protectionism did to economic
development in general and international trade in particular has been
studied many times and need not be repeated in detail here. The League
of Nations economists in their World Economic Survey 1931-3251
analyzed early on the important role which the Smoot-Hawley tariffs
played in forcing down commodity prices throughout the world and in
their Review of World Trade 1932 offered statistical details on the
price decline of 25 commodities from 1929-32. 52 Sixteen had fallen by
more than 50 percent. Since the price declines for manufactured goods
were much less than for primary products, because manufacturers tended
to react to the falling demand primarily by a reduction in production,
the terms of trade for the primary producing countries deteriorated
sharply. Their debts turned sour, and, due to the collapse of inter-
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national capital exports during the depression, not only theirs, as we
know from the case of Germany and other European countries. U.S. hopes
for collecting the interallied debts finally had to be buried in 1932.
As a result, U.S. private foreign credits were frozen, in many cases
for a long time. The volume of world exports shrank by 61 percent in
nominal terms and by 25 percent in real terms from 1929 to 1932 and
for the rest of the 1930s never recovered to its 1929 level. 53
U.S. exports, however, declined even more in the same period: 70
percent in nominal terms and 49 percent in real terms. The U.S. share
in world trade consequently fell considerably in those years. The
protective principle, on which the Republican Party had based its
international trade policies, was thus fully discredited by the reali-
ties of developments during the Great Depression.
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Table 1
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!HE DIFFERENT !ARIFF ACTS FROM 1890 Ta 1933
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Source U.S. Tariff Commission, The Tariff and its aiseory, Washinge9n D.C. 1934, p.l08-9.
Table 2
ACTUAL OR COMPUTED AD-VALOREM RATES ON DUTIABLE MERCHANDISE
IN !HE TARIFF ACTS OF 1913, 1922 AND 1930


























3. Metals and Manu-
factures of 118.3
4. Wood and Manufactures
of 26.5
5. Sugar, Molasses, and
Manufactures of 174.8








10. Flax, aemp, Jute, and
Manufactures of 132.0
11. Wood and Manufactures
of 115.2
12. Manuiactures of Silk 32.4
13. Manufactures oi
Rayon 11.4











































Sourees: (1)-(3): "Comparison of Rates of Outy in Pending Tariff Bill of 1929 ~th Tariff
Act of 1913 and Tariff Act of 1922." ilst Congress, 1st Session, Senate
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